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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1970s, federal, state, and local governments have confis-
cated money and personal property in an effort to curtail crime while
also providing a pipeline for law enforcement revenue. The crimes
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range from drug distribution to money laundering, yet the punishment
remains the same. While proponents claim that the process allows ex-
tra funds to be devoted to the growing cost in combating organized
crime, opponents contend that the policy allows for an incentive-based
system that provides law enforcement agencies the ability to directly
impact the amount of money in their bank accounts. With the growing
suspicion of police activity in the twenty-first century and the vast
amount of money these law enforcement agencies bring in from asset
forfeiture programs, the proponents have had their hands full in ward-
ing off the growing public support for forfeiture reform.
Most commonly, law enforcement agencies use civil asset forfeiture
to curtail the trafficking of illicit drugs and controlled substances while
simultaneously aiding in the law enforcement’s effort by providing
equipment and funds to law enforcement agencies. Although there is
support for the use of asset forfeiture in this arena of law enforce-
ment, as well as support for dismissing it completely, this Comment
acknowledges the need for a balance in using asset forfeiture. It would
be irresponsible to eliminate the practice of asset forfeiture altogether
since it provides benefits to law enforcement agencies while also cre-
ating a disincentive to criminals in committing the crimes. This Com-
ment, however, will show where the need is to curtail the practice and
will further highlight ways in which the process should be changed
without removing a valid tool from law enforcement.
As a model of review, this Comment will use Texas’s laws—juxta-
posed against state laws that are providing more protections—to com-
pare what Texas is doing wrong in light of what other states are doing
right. First, this Comment will give a brief history of asset forfeiture in
general and provide the status of civil asset forfeiture in the twenty-
first century. Part II will discuss the benefits of some asset forfeiture
programs while highlighting the shortcomings and burdens that civil
asset forfeiture brings. Part III will show state legislation aimed at cur-
tailing civil asset forfeiture and the factors that make Texas’s laws (ar-
guably) among the worst in the country. Finally, Part IV will discuss
what Texas and similar states should do to improve the protections
afforded to property owners and also improve the use of forfeiture
overall.1
1. This is a highly contested topic, and there is a breadth of literature in support
and against forfeiture. This Comment sets out to add to the discussion of asset forfei-
ture reform, focusing on shifting the use of civil forfeiture in favor of criminal forfei-
ture. There is much more discussion to have regarding other judicial forfeitures as
well as administrative forfeitures; thus, this Comment does not set out to discuss every
problem with forfeiture, nor does it attempt to provide solutions to the whole system.
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II. WHAT IS ASSET FORFEITURE AND HOW IS IT PREDOMINANTLY
IN USE TODAY?
A. History of Asset Forfeiture
Targeting a defendant through his property has a long tradition in
civil disputes between citizens and governments alike.2 Like many as-
pects of our judicial system, the use of asset forfeiture in the United
States is a holdover from British common law.3 The United States fed-
eral government has used the practice in two notable instances: alco-
hol prohibition from 1920 to 1933 and the “War on Drugs” since the
1980s.4
Asset forfeiture in the United States sprang, in some way or an-
other, from the English law of deodands,5 with even further roots as
far back as biblical times.6 The purpose of the deodands was to punish
the property that was guilty of an act against God.7 Eventually the
practice of deodands was abolished, and by the mid-seventeenth cen-
tury, the practice had transformed into forfeiture of property as a tool
to raise revenue for the King.8 The forfeitures started out following
most of the deodand rationale and property was taken as punishment
for felonies and treason;9 however, with the passage of the Navigation
Acts of 1600, forfeiture for other crimes continued long after the pre-
vious methods were outlawed.10 From the beginning, forfeiture was
never purely a punishment for crime; even the early rationale was
grounded in a desire to raise revenue.
The Navigation Acts took form over several years and were de-
signed to curtail the use of foreign ships bringing goods back and forth
from the British Colonies.11 The Acts required that any ship importing
or exporting to and from the British Colonies must fly the British
flag.12 If any ship operating out of the British ports had allegiance to
another country, the British navy could confiscate the cargo and the
ship.13 Thus, the beginning of civil asset forfeiture (as we know it to-
day) began. Instead of the Crown charging a person with a crime and
2. Chip Mellor, Civil Forfeiture Laws and the Continued Assault on Private Prop-




5. JIMMY GURULÉ & SANDRA GUERRA, THE LAW OF ASSET FORFEITURE 3
(Lexis Law Publ’g) (1998).
6. Id. (citing Exodus 21:28–30) (confiscating chattel that lead to a person’s death,
such as an ox goring a man).
7. GURULÉ & GUERRA, supra note 5, at 4–5.
8. Id. at 8.
9. Id. at 9.
10. Id. at 10–11.
11. Navigation Acts, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/event/Navi-
gation-Acts (last updated April 23, 2015).
12. Mellor, supra note 2.
13. Id.
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going through criminal proceedings, the government could go after
property in a civil action. Civil asset forfeiture allowed a means of cur-
tailing crimes against the Crown when access to the individual perpe-
trator was limited. It also allowed the British government to keep the
“proceeds” of the crime against the Crown. These two aspects still
drive forfeiture in the United States today.
From the passage of the British Navigation Acts, civil asset forfei-
ture has been a means of punishing the guilty owner by confiscating
his property. Early on, the reasoning was that property was culpable
of the underlying crime and could be “arrested” or seized.14 Since the
property was involved in the crime, the property could also be guilty
of facilitating that crime.15
B. Asset Forfeiture in America
Prior to alcohol prohibition, asset forfeiture in the United States
was very similar to England’s maritime laws. The United States confis-
cated property and vessels that engaged in different illegal activity,
such as piracy and smuggling.16 The practice was enforced relatively
few times,17 and except for the confiscation of Southern property dur-
ing the Civil War,18 it was not until the Eighteenth Amendment that
the United States government seized property on a wide scale.19 Now,
civil asset forfeiture is the main tool for enforcing laws against illegal
drugs.20
1. Different Asset Forfeiture Methods
There are three types of asset forfeiture currently used in the
United States: (1) criminal, (2) administrative, and (3) civil. Although
this Comment will focus on civil forfeiture, and partially posit an all-
out shift to criminal forfeiture, it is important to understand all three.
First, criminal asset forfeiture is an in personam21 action that takes
place in formal criminal proceedings against a defendant property
owner.22 Criminal forfeiture requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, and consists of multiple stages where all property owners can
14. Jarret B. Wollstein, The Government’s War on Property, FOUNDATION FOR EC-
ONOMIC EDUCATION (July 1, 1993), http://fee.org/articles/the-governments-war-on-
property/.
15. Id.
16. GURULÉ & GUERRA, supra note 5, at 11–13.
17. Mellor, supra note 2.
18. GURULÉ & GUERRA, supra note 5, at 15.
19. Id. at 16.
20. Id. at 19.
21. In personam jurisdiction is a lawsuit against an individual where the prosecut-
ing authority has jurisdiction over the individual. See DEE R. EDGEWORTH, ASSET
FORFEITURE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 1–2 (3d
ed. 2014).
22. Types of Federal Forfeiture, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/afp/
types-federal-forfeiture (last updated March 9, 2015).
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defend their interest against the government’s claim.23 Criminal forfei-
ture provides property owners the same protections defendants have
in the criminal proceedings. These forfeitures are less common be-
cause it is either: (a) hard to find a property owner to pursue in a
criminal action, or (b) because the lower burden of proof in civil pro-
ceedings is more expedient and overall more appealing for agencies.
The second method of forfeiture is through administrative agencies.
Though government agencies seize assets and property involved in
crimes, not every agency is solely in the business of law enforcement.
Some agencies, such as the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”); the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”); the Department of Treasury; and the
United States Postal Inspection Service24 enforce laws but also play an
administrative role. Administrative forfeiture is an in rem25 proceed-
ing that allows the agency to confiscate assets without having to go
through a formal judicial process.26 Through administrative forfeit-
ures, property owners are not given the opportunity to keep any item
seized, and the seizing agency only has to show probable cause to fi-
nalize the forfeiture.27 This provides a low evidentiary bar for forfei-
ture, as probable cause is the burden needed to seize the property in
the first place. These seizures are few in number because typically
only federal agencies have the opportunity to seize property through
administrative seizures, and state and local law enforcement agencies
perform the majority of forfeitures. Additionally, when agencies, such
as the DEA, perform seizures they are often on high-level offenders28
(partially due to the type of investigations those agencies do), which
prevents administrative searches from garnering some of the same
criticism that applies to civil forfeiture. Likewise, with the high-level
offenders, it is more likely the forfeiture will attach to criminal pro-
23. Id.
24. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO EQUITABLE SHARING FOR STATE AND LO-
CAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 2 (2009) [hereinafter EQUITABLE SHARING],
http://www.justice.gov/criminal-afmls/file/794696/download. There are several more
agencies involved in forfeiture; the list was only an example.
25. An in rem proceeding occurs when the court has jurisdiction over the property
and during in rem forfeiture proceedings the property itself is subject to penalty (i.e.,
forfeiture). See EDGEWORTH, supra note 21, at 2, 6–8.
26. Types of Federal Forfeiture, supra note 22.
27. Asset Forfeiture, DRUGWARFACTS.ORG 13 (Jan. 09, 2008, 5:04 PM), http://
www.drugwarfacts.org/cms/node/42/pdf.
28. See Statistics and Facts, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., http://www.dea.gov/re-
source-center/statistics.shtml; High-level offenders are those at the top of the distribu-
tion chain, who have direct control of the flow of drugs into the market and do not
typically engage in the small retail operations, see also William A. Galston & Eliza-
beth McElvein, Criminal Justice Reform: The Facts About Federal Drug Offenders,
BROOKINGS (Feb. 13, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/
2016/02/13-criminal-justice-reform-galston-mcelvein (defining a high-level offender as
a “[s]upplier/importer, organizer/leader, grower/manufacturer, wholesaler, manager/
supervisor.”).
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ceedings against the offender because of the nature of such
proceedings.
Finally, civil asset forfeiture, like administrative forfeiture, is an in
rem proceeding where the government charges the property as the
defendant.29 However, unlike administrative forfeitures, civil forfeit-
ures require formal civil proceedings. There is no need to prove own-
ership guilt, and the burden of proof to confiscate property seized is
typically only by the preponderance of the evidence.30 This type of
forfeiture is the focal point of this Comment; therefore, further expla-
nation of the process is in the discussion below.31 Simply put, civil
forfeiture attacks the property independent of a finding of the owner’s
guilt.
2. From Alcohol Prohibition to the “War on Drugs”
Alcohol prohibition was the first time the United States govern-
ment used asset forfeiture in a concerted effort to combat a particular
type of organized crime. After the passage of the Eighteenth Amend-
ment, laws were enacted that allowed law enforcement agencies to
confiscate the vehicles—and other property—used by bootleggers.32
This was key to combating the illegal distribution of alcohol, as it al-
lowed law enforcement to take the means the bootleggers had of dis-
tribution. Compared to the influx of laws at the beginning of the “War
on Drugs,” the laws passed during alcohol prohibition were miniscule.
Once the Twenty-first Amendment came into effect, the federal gov-
ernment no longer needed asset forfeiture to help combat crime on
such a large scale—and for almost fifty years, asset forfeiture fell by
the wayside.
Today, asset forfeiture is predominantly used in an attempt to com-
bat the sale and manufacturing of illicit drugs and other controlled
substances. In 1970, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act (“the Act”).33 The Act gave the federal
government broad powers in regulating drugs. The Act is predomi-
nantly known by one section—the Controlled Substances Act—which
categorizes drugs into schedules of regulations based on a variety of
29. Types of Federal Forfeiture, supra note 22.
30. Id.
31. See infra Part III.B.
32. John G. Malcom, Civil Asset Forfeiture: Good Intentions Gone Awry and the
Need for Reform, Legal Memorandum No. 151 on Legal Issues, HERITAGE FOUND.
(April 20, 2015), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/04/civil-asset-forfei-
ture-good-intentions-gone-awry-and-the-need-for-reform.
33. In 1970, Congress also passed the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Orga-
nizations Act (“RICO”), which gave narrow guidelines on what actions constitute
organized crime. See Wollstein, supra note 14. The federal government uses RICO to
seize the property of people suspected of contributing to a variety of crime, including:
money laundering, gambling, racketeering, prostitution, and others. Id. The federal
government predominantly uses the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act for confiscation of property related to drug crimes. Id.
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factors. However, the Act also provides guidelines for confiscating
property. Over the past three decades, provisions were added to the
Act that allowed the government to seize almost any property that
could be tied to illegal drug activity.34
Over the years, there have been significant additions to the Act. In
1978, Congress amended the Act to allow the seizure of “all profits
from the drug trade and all assets purchased with such proceeds.”35
For people who are involved in the illegal drug trade, this amendment
allows for the seizure of virtually all their possessions. Additionally, at
the time of arrest it is often hard for the police to determine all the
evidence pertaining to the crime; nevertheless, this amendment allows
officers to confiscate all items that could be associated with the crime
if probable cause exists to seize the items at the moment of the lawful
search. In 1984, Congress approved another notable amendment to
the Act that allows for the confiscation of real property.36 This amend-
ment increases the property that law enforcement can confiscate be-
cause if the entire building or dwelling is subject to forfeiture,
everything inside the building typically goes along with it. Addition-
ally, through this amendment, Congress highlighted the necessity to
confiscate the controlled substances that are in violation of the code.37
This amendment is important for two main reasons: first, permitting
real property forfeiture opened the door for the seizure of any prop-
erty with the smallest connection to controlled substances;38 and sec-
ond, it was fourteen years after the original passage that Congress
wanted to ensure seizing the drugs themselves.
Another act passed in 1984, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
(“CCCA”), strengthened the government’s power in seizing property
related to the illegal drug trade.39 The CCCA contains twenty-three
chapters,40 one of which pertains to civil asset forfeiture. Even more,
the CCCA created the Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture
Fund,41 which provides a means for the federal government to hold on
to proceeds from forfeitures to pay the court costs of the forfeiture
34. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (2012).
35. Marc B. Stahl, Asset Forfeiture, Burdens of Proof and the War on Drugs, 83 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 274, 277 (1992).
36. Id.
37. § 881(a)(8).
38. For instance, the Caswell family’s motel was seized and sold for $1.5 million
because thirty tenants from 1994 were arrested on drug-dealing charges. See George
F. Will, When Government is the Looter, WASH. POST (May 18, 2012), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/opinions/when-government-is-the-looter/2012/05/18/gIQAUIK
VZU_story.html. No one in the Caswell family was arrested; however, their motel
was confiscated because it was a location for repeated drug sales. Id.
39. See Scott Ehlers, Policy Briefing: Asset Forfeiture, DRUG POL’Y FOUND.
(1999), http://www.drugpolicy.org/docUploads/Asset_Forfeiture_Briefing.pdf.
40. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837.
41. The Fund, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/afp/fund (last updated
March 16, 2015).
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proceedings and future investigative expenses.42 In addition, the
CCCA provided the “equitable sharing” provision between federal
law enforcement agencies and state and local enforcement agencies.43
With “equitable sharing,” law enforcement agencies get proceeds and
property that is forfeited in proportion to the role they played with
the forfeiture investigation and seizure.44 Equitable sharing provides a
means for cooperation between the different levels of law enforce-
ment; however, with this increase in cooperation, opponents argue the
incentives also increase for officers to seize as much as they can be-
cause laws guarantee the agencies receive a percentage of the profits.
As mentioned above, criminal and civil forfeiture are the two main
pathways for seizure of personal property. While criminal asset forfei-
ture mirrors other forms of criminal punishment—the defendant must
be convicted of a crime prior to the defendant’s property to be confis-
cated—civil asset forfeiture not only mimics civil disputes (the burden
of proof is much lower), but also, civil asset forfeiture can occur inde-
pendent of a criminal proceeding.45 Civil asset forfeiture is an entirely
in rem proceeding, meaning it targets property.46 The guilt of the
property owner is not relevant to the determination of whether the
property is, itself, attached to crime.
The equitable sharing program occurs with both civil and criminal
asset forfeiture. One problem that arises is “forum shopping.” As
more jurisdictions are enacting laws to curb the use of civil forfeiture,
law enforcement agencies move forfeiture to federal jurisdiction. This
form of “forum shopping” occurs not because the local law enforce-
ment believes the federal agency provides a better chance of convict-
ing a defendant, but because the agencies know that even with laws
limiting what the state agency can do, there is a better chance the
property seized will be successfully forfeited in the federal case.
III. THE GOOD AND THE BAD OF ASSET FORFEITURE
The asset forfeiture process has the chance to provide benefits to
both the law enforcement agencies engaging in the forfeiture and the
community in which the forfeiture occurs. Acknowledging the bene-
fits, some agencies do not often take the opportunity to make the pro-
gram as effective for good. This Section will highlight what needs to
change with asset forfeiture to help the property owner access equita-
ble forms of justice; however, it is also important to discuss and under-
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 524 (2012).
45. John L. Worrall, Asset Forfeiture: Origins and Present Status, in DRUGS,
CRIMES, AND JUSTICE: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 360, 362 (Larry Gaines &
Janine Kremling, 3d ed. 2014).
46. Id.
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stand the benefits the program can provide to law enforcement
agencies.
A. The Good
It’s now possible for a drug dealer to serve time in a forfeiture-fi-
nanced prison after being arrested by agents driving a forfeiture-
provided automobile while working in a forfeiture-funded sting
operation.
—Richard “Dick” Thornburgh, 198947
Asset forfeiture allows a state to minimize the burden on the tax-
payer as it relates to police funding. The process also frees up funds in
the already-allotted budget that the various levels of government can
spend on other programs outside of policing. Although there is a com-
pletely separate discussion to be had about the necessities of certain
police equipment,48 as a society we want those who put their lives on
the line for our safety to be safe while doing so.
The aforementioned “equitable sharing” provision in the CCCA al-
lows for law enforcement agencies to share the proceeds from forfei-
ture similar to how they share in the enforcement of the drug laws.
This allows local law enforcement agencies to receive some money for
their efforts when the drug crime is removed to federal jurisdiction for
federal prosecution. Drug laws, much like immigration laws, are an
area of dual sovereignty—both the state and the federal government
have independent concerns in curtailing the sale and manufacturing of
drugs. As such, federal and state agencies are allowed to work to-
gether to achieve common goals. Both states and the federal govern-
ment have separate laws enacted to deter and punish drug crimes;
therefore, it logically follows that in regards to drug law enforcement,
there ought to be a process that allows the different agencies to bene-
fit from their cooperative efforts. With the dual sovereignty approach
to equitable sharing, the federal government can encourage coopera-
tion with its state and local counterparts because of the tangible bene-
fits associated with those efforts.
Additionally, it is sometimes difficult to access defendants to bring
criminal charges against them. Asset forfeiture allows a prosecutor’s
office to go after someone who would otherwise be unreachable
through normal criminal proceedings. Today’s reasoning, much like
the justification for the practice in the mid-seventeenth century and
during alcohol prohibition, is simple. If a criminal can constantly
47. Sarah Stillman, Taken, NEW YORKER, Aug. 12 & 19, 2013, http://www.new
yorker.com/magazine/2013/08/12/taken (Richard “Dick” Thornburgh served as Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan’s Attorney General from 1988–1991).
48. See, e.g., J. Berkeley Bentley & Arthur Rizer, The Militarization of Police: Is it
a Battle of Equipment or Mentality? (Part 1 of 3), HUFFPOST CRIME, http://www.huff
ingtonpost.com/arthur-rizer/the-militarization-of-the-police_b_7425432.html (last up-
dated May 22, 2016).
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evade jurisdiction of criminal prosecution, the property acquired at
the risk of the public should not remain in the criminal’s possession.
B. The Bad
There are several arguments against civil asset forfeiture. Oppo-
nents of civil forfeiture have varying reasons for their stance; ranging
from a lack of property owner protection to the “policing for profit”49
mantra that law enforcement agencies are provided too much direct
power over their potential budget—or at least the proceeds that go
into that budget.
Under equitable sharing, federal law enforcement agencies are al-
lowed to share the proceeds of asset forfeiture with their state and
local counterparts.50 The Department of Justice considers this pro-
gram as a means to “provide valuable additional resources to state
and local law enforcement agencies.”51 Even with laws that limit the
scope of equitable sharing,52 and with no requirement that the federal
government participate,53 most joint investigations and federal adop-
tions of state and local seizures are eligible for equitable sharing.54
However, there are certain limitations on the use of equitable shar-
ing, notably: limiting the use of funds for most salary allocations;55
continuing education costs for law enforcement officers; prohibiting
any use that is contrary to laws of the jurisdiction where the seizure
took place; purchase of food and beverage for officers or the depart-
ment; and “extravagant” expenditures.56 For this discussion, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that in every problem of civil asset forfeiture,
the equitable sharing doctrine has the potential to further exacerbate
the harm done.
1. Innocent Owner Burden
Many civil forfeiture statutes, both federal and state, place a burden
on the owner of the property to prove that the property is not associ-
ated with any criminal activity. As mentioned above, the process of
civil asset forfeiture is much different than any criminal proceeding.57
Laws in thirty-five states,58 as well as federal laws codified in the
49. See Dick Carpenter et al., Policing For Profit: The Abuse Of Civil Asset Forfei-
ture, 2nd Ed., INST. FOR JUST. (Nov., 2015), http://ij.org/report/policing-for-profit/#1.
50. EQUITABLE SHARING, supra note 24, at Forward.
51. Id.
52. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)–(3) (2012).
53. EQUITABLE SHARING, supra note 24, at 1.
54. Id. at 6.
55. Specialized salaries, overtime pay, and pay for temporary positions are al-
lowed. See id. at 19.
56. EQUITABLE SHARING, supra note 24, at 19–21.
57. See supra Part II.B.
58. Carpenter et al., supra note 48, at 20 (Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
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United States Code, place the burden on the property owner to prove
that the property is not tied to any criminal activity.59 Essentially, in
the majority of jurisdictions in the United States, the property is con-
sidered attached to the criminal activity prior to the beginning of any
proceeding, placing an undue burden on property owners to prove
otherwise and recover their property.60 Only in ten states61 and the
District of Colombia, are agencies forced to prove the property own-
ers are guilty of a crime prior to the property being seized.62 This pro-
cess makes it harder for the property owner to contest the forfeiture.
In a criminal proceeding, the defendant’s rights are protected by a
magistrate and the government must prove the defendant is guilty.
However in a civil setting, the property owner must know what to
challenge, how to challenge it, when to make the challenge, and may
sometimes be “forced” to do so without the assistance of counsel.
2. No Appointed Counsel
Another right afforded to defendants in criminal trials that property
owners in civil asset forfeiture proceedings do not receive is the right
to an attorney. The Sixth Amendment requires appointed counsel for
an indigent defendant during any proceeding that the government is
seeking a jail sentence.63 Furthermore, the Sixth Amendment pro-
vides a remedy for defendants who believe they had constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel.64 Criminal asset forfeiture has this
Constitutional guarantee because criminal forfeiture is attached to—
or dependent on—another criminal proceeding. However, few states
have extended this right to civil asset forfeiture. Since the Sixth
Amendment does not afford the right to counsel in civil settings, an
indigent property owner does not have the same protections that
would otherwise be afforded to him if the seizure occurred as a crimi-
nal forfeiture.
Additionally, it is often difficult to challenge a seizure, and if prop-
erty owners wait too long, they can risk losing everything due to statu-
torily defined time parameters. Those worries vanish with appointed
counsel because attorneys will either know of the statutorily defined
parameters or be subject to liability for malpractice if attorneys fail to
exercise their duty of care and their lack of knowledge caused actual
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South




61. Id. (California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Mississippi, Montana, New
Mexico, New York, Oregon, and Utah).
62. Id.
63. See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
64. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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harm to the defendant.65 Not only could the attorney be held civilly
liable, but also if civil asset forfeiture has the same guarantee as crimi-
nal forfeiture, then the property owner might be given another trial as
a remedy for the ineffectiveness of his counsel.66 In a criminal forfei-
ture setting, property owners would be provided counsel who must
represent them competently and diligently; whereas in a civil forfei-
ture setting, there is no such protection.
Furthermore, for indigent offenders, the cost of hiring an attorney
to get their property back often outweighs the benefits of actually re-
ceiving their property back. For instance, if a property owner had less
than a thousand dollars seized by police, it would not be cost effective
to fight the forfeiture in court because the attorney’s fees would ex-
ceed the amount of money that is recoverable. Again, the protections
afforded in a criminal proceeding give a greater advantage to the indi-
gent property owner than those afforded in civil forfeiture proceed-
ings because criminal forfeiture entitles the property owner to full
representation regardless of the expense to fight the forfeiture.
3. Financial Incentives
In civil asset forfeiture, law enforcement agencies have direct con-
trol of the amount of money in their agency’s treasury. In forty-three
states67 and the federal jurisdiction, the law enforcement agencies can
keep 45%–100% of the proceeds from civil asset forfeiture.68 In
twenty-four states,69 law enforcement agencies can keep up to 100%
of the forfeiture proceeds.70 In all, only seven states71 and the District
of Columbia completely “block law enforcement access to forfeiture
proceeds.”72
With the significant financial incentives, opportunities for some law
enforcement agencies to misuse the power naturally arise. There are
different reports from several jurisdictions showing the abuse of the
forfeiture system. For example, in Tenaha, Texas, the infamous civil
65. See id. at 694–96.
66. See id.
67. Carpenter et al., supra note 48, at 14 (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illi-
nois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis-
sissippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Vir-
ginia, and Wyoming).
68. Id.
69. Id. (Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Vir-
ginia, and Wyoming).
70. Id.
71. Id. (Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina, and
Wisconsin).
72. Id.
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forfeiture scheme netted the local law enforcement agency “millions
of dollars through highway traffic stops.”73 The local law enforcement
officers would stop cars on the highway, and once cash or other valua-
ble assets were discovered, the officers would threaten the property
owners with criminal charge if the owners did not waive their owner-
ship rights.74 Motorists were threatened with crimes such as money
laundering,75 and one family was forced to forfeit over six thousand
dollars in fear that the police would take the two children to Child
Protective Services.76 Though this is just one extreme example, it is
easy to see the various ways police agencies can abuse their power
over asset forfeiture.
The old mantra “power corrupts and absolute power corrupts abso-
lutely” is true with civil forfeiture. When law enforcement agencies
are in direct control over any amount of money that their budget has,
it is human nature that the “bad eggs” will go to great lengths to abuse
the system. Thus, the argument flows that most seizures occur, in part,
because the law enforcement officers know the end result with
forfeiture.
4. Burden of Proof
The burden of proof the government has to seize property is an area
of heightened criticism. Nationwide, preponderance of the evidence is
the most common burden of proof, with thirty-one states and the fed-
eral jurisdiction using it.77 With this burden, the government only has
to show that there is more than a 50% chance that the property in
question was attached to criminal acts.78 The burden of proof for a
successful forfeiture, nationwide, ranges from probable cause—the
same burden that law enforcement agents have to prove a valid
seizure—to preponderance of the evidence, to clear and convincing
evidence, and even proof beyond a reasonable doubt79 as required by
two states.80 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the burden of proof
used for criminal proceedings, the reasoning being that, as a society,
we want a high standard of proof before taking away someone’s life or
liberty.81 However, there are a substantial number of jurisdictions that
73. Id. at 16.
74. Id.
75. Howard Witt, Highway Robbery? Texas Police Seize Black Motorists’ Cash,





79. Id. at 16–17 (Nebraska and South Carolina).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 16.
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place a lower threshold on taking away someone’s property through
civil forfeiture not predicated on a criminal conviction.82
The low standard of proof throughout most of the country makes it
simultaneously easier for the government to seize the property while
making it harder for the property owners to protect their interests.
Additionally, civil forfeiture is used as a simpler means to an end in-
stead of going through criminal proceedings.83 Since civil forfeiture
does not require that any person be held criminally responsible, law
enforcement agencies are seemingly allowed to confiscate property at
will where the jurisdictional policies allow civil forfeiture as an alter-
native to criminal proceedings.
5. Arbitrary Punishment
Civil asset forfeiture also promotes arbitrary punishments by at-
tempting a “one size fits all” approach to justice. Civil forfeiture stat-
utes provide blanket access to property believed to be associated with
criminal activity. For instance, if law enforcement officers are issuing
multiple arrest warrants on defendants located in a house known for
drug activity and drugs are found, the officers can seize all the vehicles
on the property, even if one car cost $500 and another cost $35,000.
Likewise, for indigent property owners, the amount of money
seized, or the particular asset that is forfeited, might equate to more
time than if they were punished criminally and served jail time. A sim-
ple possession charge of cannabis in the state of Texas can end with a
person spending no time in jail;84 however, a seizure with the same
possession charge could leave that same person without his car,
money, and any other item deemed to be “attached” to the crime of
possession. With these simple examples, it is possible to see how the
punishment of asset forfeiture—completely losing the property—out-
weighs the punishment if the person was only charged as a criminal
defendant through the penal code.
6. A “Double Bite of Apple”
Civil asset forfeiture can operate completely independent of crimi-
nal proceedings. Opponents argue this process does one of two things:
it either (1) provides a “second chance” for the prosecution to punish
the criminal; or (2) allows the prosecution to forgo the criminal pro-
ceedings when it is unlikely those proceedings will be successful. As
mentioned above, the lower burden of proof in the majority of juris-
dictions throughout the country allows law enforcement agencies to
82. See generally id.
83. Id. at 18.
84. In Texas, a possession charge for less than two ounces of Cannabis is a Class B
Misdemeanor punishable by either a fine of $2,000 and a maximum sentence of 180
days in jail. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.121 (West 2006); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.22 (West 2006).
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choose which path to forfeiture is the “best” for each individual situa-
tion. If a prosecutor does not believe criminal proceedings will be suc-
cessful, his or her office can simply go after the property in a civil
forfeiture proceeding to punish the defendant. Much like how asset
forfeiture began (as a means to access defendants that were not avail-
able), now the prosecutor can use civil forfeiture to access the other-
wise inaccessible defendant because criminal charges either cannot be
brought against defendant in the first place, or it is likely that the
criminal proceeding will not be successful.85 Just as there is criticism
that prosecutors are more focused on the conviction than justice, the
system of civil asset forfeiture allows the prosecutor’s office to go after
someone’s property when the person cannot otherwise be convicted.
C. The Middle Ground
Put simply, we can have criminal asset forfeiture without practicing
civil asset forfeiture. There is no law that requires civil asset forfeiture;
instead, it is simply one tool at the prosecutor and agency’s disposal to
seize the property tied to crime. The positive outcomes that are pro-
vided through asset forfeiture86 can still be realized without the nega-
tives of civil forfeiture.
Some states are already taking steps to fix the status quo. As the
next Section will discuss, there are states moving to curb the propen-
sity for bad forfeitures, but Texas still falls behind in providing prop-
erty owner protections through the forfeiture process. Texas is not
completely alone in its approach to forfeiture, as currently only nine
states87 require the property owner to be convicted of a crime prior to
being subject to most asset forfeiture.88
IV. WHAT STATES ARE DOING WITH ASSET FORFEITURE
There are many reports on the different procedures that exist from
one jurisdiction to another. Some states are doing a good job of cur-
tailing the “bad” of asset forfeiture that was discussed above, while
some states are still lagging behind. A brief overview of three, slightly
varying, better state models for dealing with asset forfeiture is re-
quired before this Comment highlights what is going wrong in Texas.
The discussion in this Section will show what states do to increase
85. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit a prosecutor from bringing
a charge that he knows is not supported by probable cause. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2013).
86. Benefits include removing the burden from the taxpayer, disrupting the pro-
ceeds of criminal activities, and removing incentives for criminals to continue their
operations. See supra Part III.A.
87. Carpenter et al., supra note 48, at 17 (California, Minnesota, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, and Vermont).
88. Id.
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property rights, and juxtapose what those states are doing with what
Texas does and fails to do.
A. States That are Doing it Well
This Section will use the model provided by three states: (1) New
Mexico, (2) Missouri, and (3) California. Two of these states, Califor-
nia and New Mexico, share the status of a “border state” with Texas,
and all three states have similar “drug corridors” as Texas does. All
three states have varying degrees of protecting property rights, and all
three states are ranked higher than Texas by the Institute for Justice.
1. New Mexico
On April 10, 2015, New Mexico Governor Susana Martinez signed
into law House Bill 560, which requires a person to be convicted of an
underlying crime before his property can be seized and subjected to
forfeiture.89 This act includes many purposes such as “protect[ing] the
constitutional rights of persons . . . protect[ing] against the wrongful
forfeiture of property . . . and ensur[ing] that only criminal forfeiture
is allowed in the state.”90 Another purpose of the act includes reduc-
ing the economic incentive of criminal activity.91 Fully codified, the
New Mexico statute allows the confiscation of property only if the
property owner was arrested and convicted of a criminal offense.
Even then, the state must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the property is subject to forfeiture.92 Additionally, for a law enforce-
ment officer to seize property without a prior court order, the officer
must have either: (1) probable cause that the property is subject to
forfeiture, and that the person named in the search or arrest warrant is
the owner of the property; (2) proof the property is subject to forfei-
ture from a previous judgment for the state; or (3) probable cause that
the property is subject to forfeiture and the delay in getting a proper
order will result in the destruction of evidence.93
This differs from other models where the presumption is that the
property is tied to the underlying illegal act. In the second edition of
“Policing for Profit”—the Institute for Justice’s report on civil asset
forfeiture in the United States—New Mexico earned the highest
grade, an “A-” for its civil forfeiture laws.94 The Institute for Justice
highlighted numerous reasons as to why New Mexico is the best state
for asset forfeiture protections, which include: New Mexico’s higher
89. New Mexico Governor Signs Historic Property Rights Protections into Law,
DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE (April 10, 2015), http://www.drugpolicy.org/news/2015/04/
new-mexico-governor-signs-historic-property-rights-protections.
90. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-2(A)(2), (5)–(6) (1978 & Supp. 2015).
91. § 31-27-2(A)(3) (1978 & Supp. 2015).
92. § 31-27-4(A)(3) (1978 & Supp. 2015).
93. § 31-27-4(E).
94. Carpenter et al., supra note 48, at 108.
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standard for forfeiture, the requirement that the property owner be
convicted of a crime prior to the assets being forfeited, protections for
innocent property owners, and the distribution of proceeds from
forfeiture.95
Additionally, New Mexico explicitly provides protections for inno-
cent property owners within the statutes. The State must immediately
return all property to the innocent owner if the state cannot meet the
additional burdens outlined in the statute.96 To assert the innocent-
owner defense, property owners must show (1) that they hold a legal
right or interest in the property, and (2) that they held the ownership
interest in the property at the time of the criminal conduct or were
bona fide purchasers following the illegal conduct.97 For the State to
be successful in the forfeiture proceedings, the State must show that
the innocent owner had actual knowledge of the underlying crime.98
New Mexico has taken steps to ensure asset forfeiture is used only
as a tool to combat economic activity surrounding crime, and is lim-
ited in scope to only target property in situations that the owner has
been convicted of a serious crime—ensuring a more balanced result.
New Mexico is able to increase the burden for forfeiture proceedings
and protect innocent property owners, virtually doing away with the
harms inherent in the civil forfeiture system.
2. Missouri
Missouri’s Criminal Activity Forfeiture Act (“CAFA”) controls the
State’s asset forfeiture procedure.99 CAFA has both a civil and a crim-
inal side to it, but if the forfeiture arises from the same events that a
criminal charge arises from, then no property is forfeited unless the
criminal–defendant property owner is found guilty of a felony that
substantially relates to the forfeiture.100 The Institute for Justice gave
Missouri a “B+” grade for its forfeiture laws.101 The report highlighted
Missouri’s conviction requirement and the state policy that law en-
forcement agencies do not receive any proceeds as a direct result from
their asset forfeiture programs. However, the poor protections for
property owners were a factor that led to Missouri not scoring as high
as New Mexico.102 While Missouri requires a criminal conviction prior
to the forfeiture of assets, it is still a low standard of connecting prop-
erty to the criminal act post conviction.103 This means that although
there is a provision in place requiring the property owner to be crimi-
95. Id.
96. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-7.1 (1978 & Supp. 2015).
97. § 31-27-7.1(B).
98. § 31-27-7.1(D), (F).
99. MO. ANN. STAT. § 513.600 (West 2002).
100. MO. ANN. STAT. § 513.617(1) (West 2002).
101. Carpenter et al., supra note 48, at 96.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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nally convicted, once the owner is convicted, the State can easily at-
tach the owner’s interest in the property. Additionally, third-party
property owners must enter into the proceedings and prove: (1) they
had no knowledge of the underlying criminal act; and (2) they did not
know their property would be used or associated with any crime.104
Without doing so, the property of the innocent third party could be
completely forfeited because the burden is on the property owner—
not the State.
Missouri, like New Mexico, also affords protection for innocent
property owners; defining those owners who did not have actual
knowledge of the property’s connection with the criminal activity as
“innocent.”105 Missouri allows innocent property owners to assert
their claim to the property by entering the forfeiture proceeding at
any time before the final judgment.106 Furthermore, any valid claim by
an innocent property owner supersedes the State’s or county’s claim
on the same property.107 In Missouri, innocent property owners have
the opportunity to assert their property interest during the forfeiture
proceedings. If the assertion is a valid claim that the owner did not
have actual knowledge of the criminal activity, the property will be
released to the owner regardless of any outcome against the criminal
defendant.
3. California
The state of California has taken the first steps to enact legislation
to curtail the ability of local agencies to remove cases to federal juris-
diction to take advantage of the lower evidentiary standard.108 Similar
to the New Mexico law, the California bill requires defendants be
found guilty of a crime before their property can be permanently for-
feited. However, the Institute for Justice gave California a “C+”
grade.109 Although California has taken steps to protect innocent
property owners, California’s local and state law enforcement agen-
cies participate in the federal equitable sharing program at a large
rate—ranking 50th out of all United States jurisdictions for federal
forfeiture.110 Even though California has taken strides to limit the
problems with civil asset forfeiture, the agencies within the state have
no bar against removing seizures to federal jurisdiction.111
104. Id.
105. MO. ANN. STAT. § 513.615 (2002).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. California Forfeiture Bill Passes Through the Senate, DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE
(June 3, 2015), http://www.drugpolicy.org/news/2015/06/bill-rein-asset-forfeiture-abu
ses-california-sails-through-senate-38-1-vote.
109. Carpenter et al., supra note 48, at 54.
110. Id. at 54–55.
111. See generally id. at 55.
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In California, the Health and Safety Code codifies asset forfeiture
laws. Following the standard as passed in the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act, California allows agencies to seize drug contraband
and property used to facilitate the contraband.112 California also of-
fers protections for innocent property owners. Third parties may enter
the forfeiture proceedings at any time to claim their interest in the
property subject to forfeiture.113 If an innocent owner comes forward,
the State has the burden to show that the owner consented to the
property being used and had actual knowledge of the criminal activ-
ity.114 Once actual knowledge is shown, the State still has to meet the
burden of proof to forfeit the property. The State must show proof
beyond a reasonable doubt to forfeit the property, and for most prop-
erty—vehicles, negotiable instruments, securities, and real prop-
erty115—there must be a criminal conviction attached to the
forfeiture.116 The only property that is subjected to a lower burden of
proof is cash or equivalents of $25,000 or more. This type of property
is subject to clear and convincing evidence,117 mainly because large
sums of money are easy to tie to criminal activity.
Additionally, California has determined how state agencies may use
the proceeds from forfeiture. For instance, the law mandates that no
state agencies can use seized or forfeited property in their regular day-
to-day service.118 Also, unless another rule allows (and few do), all
forfeiture proceeds must be maintained in a separate account and is
subject to accounting controls and financial audits of all deposits and
expenditures.119 Not only are there the above measures, but the At-
torney General must also compile an aggregate forfeiture report using
the data that each state and local agency must provide.120
B. What Texas is Doing
Texas, on the other hand, has a very low rank for property-owner
protection in terms of asset forfeiture, with the Institute for Justice
giving Texas a “D+” grade.121 In Texas, the burden of proof that the
government must overcome to confiscate property is only by prepon-
derance of the evidence, and after the initial seizure, the property
owner has the burden of proving the property has no link to criminal
112. Compare CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11472 (West 2007 & Supp. 2016)
with 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(h)–(q) (West 2016).
113. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11488.5(a)(1) (West 2007 & Supp. 2016).
114. § 11488.5(d).
115. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11488.4(i)(1) (West 2007 & Supp. 2016).
116. § 11488.4(i)(3).
117. § 11488.4(i)(4).
118. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11469(g) (West 2007 & Supp. 2016).
119. § 11469(h).
120. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11495(c)–(e) (West 2015).
121. Carpenter et al., supra note 48, at 132.
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activity.122 This directly links into the discussion above,123 where the
lowest and worst burden of proof required is the one used in Texas.
Additionally, Texas law enforcement agencies collect, on average,
over $41 million through civil asset forfeiture per year.124 Of course,
Texas has a large amount of assets for potential forfeiture because of
the State’s size and location as a border state. However, Texas also
ranks 47th in terms of the equitable sharing between local law en-
forcement agencies and their federal counterparts.125 Unlike Califor-
nia where property owners have more rights under the state model, in
Texas property owners are not afforded more protections in one juris-
diction over the other.
In Texas, Chapter 59 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
(“TX-CCP”) governs civil and criminal forfeiture. Every law enforce-
ment agency has the authority to seize property suspected of ties to
criminal activity.126 Seizure can occur with the authorization from a
valid warrant; consent from a person with control over the property;
or through any lawful arrest, lawful search, or a lawful search incident
to an arrest.127 Normally the probable cause necessary to search and
arrest a suspect or search a place requires the use of a warrant.128 In
civil forfeiture, once the officer is lawfully in place, the probable cause
necessary to seize contraband is merely whether there is “reasonable
belief that a substantial connection exists” between the property and
the underlying crime.129 Texas has added a provision protecting the
right to counsel, stating that Chapter 59 of the TX-CCP “is not in-
tended to abridge an accused person’s right to counsel in a criminal
case.”130 Although on the face it seems that this would extend the
right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants in the civil forfei-
ture proceedings, the meaning of the application of Article 59.09 is as
a reiteration of the right to counsel in criminal proceedings.
The TX-CCP also explicitly states that a conviction is not required
for property to be eligible for forfeiture proceedings.131 Not only this,
but even if a defendant is acquitted in his criminal suit, that acquittal
only raises a presumption that the property is not eligible for forfei-
ture.132 The prosecuting agency can overcome this presumption by ap-
plying a constructive knowledge test to the property owner. That is,
122. Id.
123. See supra Part III.B.4.
124. Carpenter et al., supra note 48, at 132.
125. Id. at 133.
126. See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. § 59.03 (West 2011 & Supp. 2015).
127. § 59.03(a)–(b).
128. See generally TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. §§ 14-15, 18 (West 2011 &
Supp. 2015).
129. 1991 Nissan Pickup v. State, 896 S.W.2d 344, 345 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1995,
no writ).
130. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. § 59.09 (West 2015).
131. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. § 59.05(d) (West 2015).
132. Id.
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the property is still subject to forfeiture if the owner should have
known that the property was tied to criminal activity.133
For a successful forfeiture, the State must do two things. First, the
prosecution must show the probable cause standard addressed
above—that there is a substantial connection between the crime and
the property. Second, the prosecution must show by a preponderance
of the evidence that the property is contraband.134 Sometimes it is eas-
ier to show the connection between the crime and the property. For
instance, if contraband is found inside a backpack, then it is easy to
draw the line between the crime (possession of the contraband) and
the property used to further that crime (the backpack). For other
items, such as currency, it is more difficult. Texas courts found five
factors to determine if currency is connected to drug trafficking: (1)
proximity of the money to the drugs; (2) evidence the money was used
with drugs; (3) suspicious activity; (4) the amount of money; and (5)
testimony that there was probable cause to seize the money, and a
substantial connection exists between the money and the criminal ac-
tivity.135 Although Texas courts created a balancing test to determine
the connection between currency and drugs, the factors themselves
are no more than minor inferential conclusions. For instance, if some-
one has a couple hundred dollars in the backpack with the drugs or
contraband, then all the factors are met without ever having to prove
the money was used to facilitate the flow of drugs.
Texas does provide a quasi-innocent owner defense. Seized prop-
erty is not subject to forfeiture if owners acquired their property inter-
est before or during the crime, and did not know (actually or
constructively) of the criminal act leading to the forfeiture.136 In appli-
cation, this is a heavy burden for property owners to take on, espe-
cially compared with the easy burden the State has in forfeiting the
property. If all the State has to do is show a reasonable connection
between the property and the crime, it is difficult for the owner to
come forward and claim that he still has a valid interest.
The majority of seizures in Texas come under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Public Services (“DPS”) along the “drug corridors” of
interstates I-40, I-20, I-35, US-59, and US-77.137 When the DPS en-
counters a seizure case, they have one of two options; either (1) file
the case with the District or County Attorney where the offense oc-
curred; or (2) DPS can send the case to a federal agency, which is
133. Id.
134. $132,265 v. State, 409 S.W.3d 17, 23 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no
pet.).
135. Id. at 25.
136. $18,800 v. State, 961 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no
writ).
137. AUSTIN CLEMENS ET AL., OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., ASSET FORFEITURE IN
TEXAS: DPS AND COUNTY INTERACTIONS 5–6 (Pub. Policy Research Inst. ed., 2014),
http://www.txcourts.gov/media/782473/sting-report-final.pdf.
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often the Department of Justice or the Department of Commerce.138
The path that the DPS chooses will determine where the proceeds of
the forfeiture will end up. It could either be split between the federal
government and the state, which requires an equitable sharing peti-
tion, or between the state and local agencies.139
Often, the DPS chooses to work with the local authorities, and in
2012, only 17% of DPS forfeiture cases were sent to federal jurisdic-
tion.140 Even so, with seizures valued at $500,000 or more, the DPS is
quick to use federal agencies.141 This is a double-edged sword. First,
since the majority of forfeitures are shared between the DPS and local
agencies, the incentive to increase the amount of forfeitures remains
because the DPS gets a larger cut from cooperation with local agen-
cies. Additionally, the opportunity cost that is associated with more
involvement of local agencies is alive as local authorities have a finan-
cial incentive in joining forfeiture cases that does not exist when pur-
suing other law enforcement operations.142 Second, DPS is more
inclined to use local agencies because DPS is guaranteed a piece of
the proceeds. Although it is advantageous to use the federal govern-
ment due to increased investigation techniques, experience in the
crimes, and the availability of more money to devote to the process,143
the DPS prefers local agencies. The DPS only uses the federal govern-
ment when there is a large sum of money involved, in part because it
is more likely the DPS will get more property or funds. Not only is
there an increased incentive to use the local agencies, which in turn
decreases police focus on other crimes, but there is also a financial
incentive to not use the federal government’s expertise, personnel,
and budget—creating a “log jam” amongst the local agencies while
alternatives exist.
Of course, this problem with the DPS choosing which jurisdiction to
file its cases with only involves forfeitures that originate with DPS op-
erations. Even though the majority of forfeitures occur through DPS
Highway Patrol and Texas Rangers, there are still forfeitures that—
from start to finish—are wholly concentrated within a single agency.
The rest of the forfeitures not covered under the DPS are adminis-
tered by local prosecuting agencies, predominantly, Criminal District
Attorney offices and County Prosecutor offices. These local agencies
do not typically have the discretion afforded to the DPS. If those local
agencies want help in investigating or prosecuting forfeiture-applica-
138. Id. at 10.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 11.
141. See id. at 12.
142. For a discussion of opportunity cost as it relates to law enforcement, see
GEORGE GASCÓN & TODD FOGLESONG, MAKING POLICING MORE AFFORDABLE:
MANAGING COSTS AND MEASURING VALUE IN POLICING, (Nat’l Inst. of Justice ed.,
2010), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/231096.pdf.
143. See CLEMENS ET AL., supra note 132, at 13–14.
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ble crimes, they are directly hit with the decrease in funds. Whereas
the DPS can prosecute independently, use local agencies, or remove
the case to federal jurisdiction, local prosecutors are only given the
option of going solo or calling the feds.
Currently, there is an inherent barrier to passing asset forfeiture re-
form in Texas. In the last congressional session, Representative David
Simpson of the Texas House of Representatives proposed a bill that
would require a conviction requirement prior to the State moving for-
ward with forfeiture proceedings.144 The reason for the bill’s demise?
A lack of support from law enforcement agencies in Representative
Simpson’s district.145 Not only did Representative Simpson’s bill re-
quire a criminal conviction for forfeiture proceedings, but it also pro-
posed an all-out shift from the civil asset forfeiture route,146 requiring
law enforcement to always move forward with criminal proceedings
against a person defendant. With large police officer unions in Texas,
it is difficult to get this type of reform passed through the legislature.
V. WHAT TEXAS SHOULD DO
Many proposed changes to asset forfeiture programs follow the
same general idea. This Section furthers the discussion as to what
should be done in Texas. Below are proposed changes, some of which
have support behind them, and some are specifically tailored for this
Comment.
A. Get Rid of Civil Asset Forfeiture and Increase
the Burden of Proof
First, Texas should get rid of civil asset forfeiture altogether. As
mentioned above, every benefit of civil asset forfeiture can be attained
through criminal forfeiture, with none of the burdens on the property
owner.147 If a property owner is found to be guilty by a court of law,
then the government can prove that the property was acquired
through the illegal conduct. However, with civil asset forfeiture, truly
innocent property owners are suffering losses due to a system that is
built to work against them, and courts have to take a larger inferential
leap to attach and forfeit the property.
Moreover, simply removing civil forfeiture from the law enforce-
ment agencies’ arsenals is not enough because the federal equitable
sharing program allows the local agencies to move the drug cases to
the federal jurisdiction and use federal civil asset forfeiture laws. Un-
less Texas simultaneously passes legislation forbidding local and state
144. Glenn Evans, Simpson Asset Bill Dies on Law Enforcement Objection, LONG-




147. See supra Part III.A–B.
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agencies from removing the drug case to federal jurisdiction, Texas
will face the same problems that California is having now. It is likely
Texas will pass a state law meant to curtail the use of civil asset forfei-
ture—or at least limit the major problems with civil forfeiture—that is
easily circumvented by use of the federal equitable sharing program.
B. Provide Guaranteed Counsel for Indigent Property Owners
Alternatively, if Texas does not end the use of civil forfeiture, which
does have an inherent barrier in the current makeup of the Texas Leg-
islature,148 the State should extend the right to counsel to the civil
cases where someone’s property is forfeited. Currently, indigent prop-
erty owners in Texas are not provided the assistance of counsel in civil
forfeiture proceedings. As mentioned above, although Texas purports
to afford the right to counsel in the civil proceedings, there is no guar-
anteed right for indigent property owners.149 Without the guaranteed
right to counsel, there is effectively no way an indigent property
owner can successfully fight a contested forfeiture proceeding. If
Texas cannot pass legislation getting rid of civil asset forfeiture en-
tirely, one step shy of that is to provide guaranteed counsel. In a civil
forfeiture scheme, guaranteed counsel might be enough to protect the
property interest for those owners who currently cannot afford
counsel.
C. Place the Seized Assets in General Funds
Currently in Texas, anywhere from 70% to 100% of all proceeds, as
a result of civil asset forfeiture, are given to the individual law en-
forcement agencies that ran the forfeiture or aided in it as part of the
federal equitable sharing program.150 Texas should follow other states,
such as New Mexico, and remove the direct control law enforcement
agencies have over extra money in their budget.
There are two popular methods of diverting the funds away from
law enforcement agencies. First, the proceeds can be put in a state
general fund, where allocation of extra money goes through a bidding
process. Through this method, law enforcement agencies would not
automatically get a percentage of proceeds from civil forfeiture. In-
stead, money can be allocated to where it is needed the most. The
money would only go to the law enforcement agency if no other gov-
ernment department needs the funding. If the Texas Legislature finds
that certain law enforcement agencies will benefit from extra money,
148. The Texas Legislature is a body known to “kill” legislation, where some legis-
lators believe the process is meant to defeat bills. See Madlin B. Mekelburg, Dozens
of Prominent Bills Died in Texas’ Legislative Session, HOUS. CHRON., June 1, 2015,
http://www.chron.com/news/politics/article/Texas-bills-that-died-this-legeslative-ses
sion-6299466.php.
149. See supra Part IV.B.
150. Carpenter et al., supra note 48, at 132.
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then the legislature can decide on that by reading petitions from the
agencies themselves. This small degree of separation might be enough
to curtail the “policing for profit” system currently in place. Further-
more, agencies are supposed to go to Congress for more funding, as
the legislative branch has traditionally had the “power of the purse.”
By changing the way agencies gain the money from forfeiture, we can
further the necessary separation of powers policy in our government.
Secondly, the proceeds from civil forfeiture can go to offender edu-
cation, rehabilitation programs, and prison programs that can help the
certificate of rehabilitation be more than just a stamp. Not all of these
programs will be completely beneficial because not every program has
a high success rate, but the money can be allocated here based on the
same argument that expands asset forfeiture. If there are certain
crimes against society that place a higher burden on society than
others, then a more cost effective way of eradicating the particular
crime may not be an increase in enforcement practices, but may be in
an increase of offender education. Money can go to the programs that
make it less likely to see the same people go in and out of the judicial
system, which would in turn decrease the burden on law enforcement.
Most of asset forfeiture is done as a tool for the “War on Drugs”;
however, with the high recidivism rates, particularly amongst drug of-
fenders,151 the more beneficial method of lowering the crime—and as
such, lowering the burden on society the crime causes—might be in
education, not enforcement.
Not all of the proceeds have to go to general funds for the benefit of
other state and local programs. An alternative to general funds is to
put the money in programs that provide victim assistance. One pro-
gram that Texas already utilizes is the Crime Victims’ Compensation
program. This program is implemented through the Office of the At-
torney General and is provided to support victims of violent crimes by
providing financial assistance for the crime-related expenses.152 The
victims must first seek reimbursement through other sources such as
insurance, Medicare or Medicaid, and workers compensation. But if
those other venues are not successful, then victims can qualify for as-
sistance from $50,000–$75,000.153 Texas should open the door and al-
low funds acquired through forfeiture programs to attribute to the
Crime Victims’ Compensation. Since the policy behind drug law en-
forcement (and other crimes that are subjected to forfeiture) is that
151. For a general discussion on the recidivism rates, see Recidivism, NAT’L INST.
OF JUST., http://www.nij.gov/topics/corrections/recidivism/pages/welcome.aspx (last
updated June 17, 2014); For a discussion on the recidivism rates for drug offenders, see
Ryan S. King & Marc Mauer, Distorted Priorities: Drug Offenders in State Prisons,
SENT’G PROJECT (Sept., 2002), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/01/Distorted-Priorities-Drug-Offenders-in-State-Prisons.pdf.
152. Crime Victims’ Compensation, ATT’Y GEN. TEXAS, https://texasattorneygener
al.gov/cvs/crime-victims-compensation (last visited Feb. 20, 2016).
153. Id.
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society is victimized, there is not a group of victims for these crimes
(other than society itself). If forfeiture proceeds were added to funds
such as the Crime Victim’s Compensation, then there is the potential
that more victims could be included in the programs and those victims
that are part of the program can receive more money. Instead of chan-
neling the majority of the forfeiture proceeds to law enforcement pro-
grams, the above ways show the money can go to the benefit of
society and take away the financial incentive.
VI. CONCLUSION
Civil asset forfeiture is used throughout the United States as a tool
to enforce the law, combat the economy behind crime, and create a
disincentive in engaging in criminal activity. In Texas, the program is
used on a wide scale to help enforce the “War on Drugs,” among
other programs. Due to a lower burden of proof, lack of appointed
counsel, and other burdens placed on property owners, it is not only
hard for innocent property owners to protect their property, but it is
equally as easy for law enforcement agencies to misuse civil forfeiture
to increase the money in their treasury. Some states—such as New
Mexico, Missouri, and California—should act as leaders in the reform
movement. Texas has a lot of work to do to create a more equitable
process, that includes: getting rid of civil asset forfeiture completely;
increasing the State’s burden of proof; providing guaranteed counsel;
and diverting the funds away from law enforcement agencies. There
are ways to fix the current system of civil asset forfeiture, without re-
moving the seizure of assets from the arsenal that law enforcement
agencies can rely on. Forfeiture can still be an effective tool to combat
criminal activity, without creating the unnecessary burdens that are
currently placed on property owners. The good news: Texas has no-
where to go but up, and any step the State takes will be an improve-
ment on the current system.
